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Summary 
Aim of this paper is to study whether and how the firm’s decision to outsource 
production activities affects its technological performance. In particular, we look at how 
the alignment between the firm’s governance strategy and the underlying attributes of 
the transactions affects the capacity of the firm to introduce new products and processes. 
Using microeconomic data on a repeated cross-section of Italian manufacturing firms 
for the period 1998-2003, we develop a two-stage approach: first, we estimate the 
determinants of the firm’s organizational governance (production outsourcing); second, 
we incorporate a measure of governance misalignment into a technological performance 
relation. We find (i) that firms not aligned with the optimal organizational governance 
perform less well in terms of process innovation than more aligned competitors, but (ii) 
that misalignment has a positive effect on product innovation. However, this 
counterintuitive result is strongly characterized by non-linear effects that reverse the 
latter correlation for high values of governance misfit. 
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Since the second half of the 1990s, entry into the world market by new pro-
ducers from low labor cost economies, such as China, India, and some other
European eastern countries, has dramatically changed the way that goods
and services are manufactured. The consequent increasing fragmentation
of production - that is, the splitting-up of vertically integrated processes
in relatively autonomous production stages located in diﬀerent geographical
areas - has aﬀected ﬁrms’ production technology, and models of governance
and organization of production transactions. The recent literature on inter-
national fragmentation has separately investigated two main aspects of this
phenomenon of fragmentation: its determinants and its performance im-
plications. Determinants of the ﬁrm’s decision to contract out production
include labor cost savings, scale economies, technology, the lack of domestic
skilled labor and the availability of qualiﬁed middle management in the host
country (Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Girma
and G¨ org, 2004; Tomiura, 2004; Diaz-Mora, 2005; Bartel, Lach, and Sicher-
man, 2005; Antras, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006). The research on
the impact of outsourcing on ﬁrms’ economic performance, typically inves-
tigated using diﬀerent measures of productivity and proﬁtability (Glass and
Saggi, 2001; Gorzig and Stephan, 2002; Heshmati, 2003; Girma and G¨ org,
2004; G¨ org and Hanley, 2004; Amiti and Wei, 2006), has not reached strongly
unambiguous results.
In our view, these two streams of the literature do not depict a complete
picture of this trend. The ﬁrst strand examines only a sub-set of the factors
underlying the decision to externalize production; the latter risks identifying
a ’spurious’ relationship because it does not take adequate account of the
fact that outsourcing also aﬀects the organizational structure of production
and, hence, the ﬁrm’s techno-economic performance.
This paper aims to remedy this by looking at the link between outsourc-
ing and ﬁrm’s performance from a diﬀerent perspective and based on three
insights. First, since the choice to outsource production activities implies
a re-organization of ﬁrm’s transaction governance, this will have an impact
on technological performance. The geographic re-location of ineﬃcient, low-
cost, or routine activities allows ﬁrms to focus on their ’core competencies’
(Prahlad and Hamel, 1990), that is, on those activities where they have
a comparative advantage. Second, based on a normative interpretation of
2transaction costs theory (Williamson, 1975, 1991), we are able to assess
empirically whether or not the ’observed’ organizational arrangement of
production can be considered eﬃcient, in the sense of being in line with
transaction cost economics (TCE) principles. We can thus determine the
level of misalignment in the governance of the observed organizational struc-
ture with respect to the optimal solution, determined by transaction-level
attributes such as uncertainty and asset speciﬁcity. Finally, extending a
recent strand in the literature that empirically investigates the relationship
between ’observed’ organizational choices and ﬁrms’ techno-economic out-
comes, we analyze the performance implications of organizational misalign-
ment. We would expect that technological performance would be negatively
aﬀected by a greater degree of misalignment, and the better alignment of
the organization of production with TCE theory would increase technologi-
cal performance.
Within this framework, we follow a two-stage econometric methodology by
estimating, in the ﬁrst stage, a ’governance selection’ model to test the
hypothesis that a ﬁrm’s organizational structure depends on two sets of
factors: (i) the characteristics of transactions, particularly uncertainty and
asset speciﬁcity; and, (ii) as suggested by the international fragmentation of
production (IFP) literature, variables such as technology, labor costs, and
export propensity. We deﬁne the misalignment variable as the diﬀerence
between observed organizational choices and those predicted by the theory.
Once we have derived the degree of observed governance misﬁt, we next
estimate the impact of this variable on ﬁrms’ technological performance,
measured as product and process innovations.
For the empirical analysis, we use a ﬁrm-level balanced repeated cross-
section sample of 1.777 Italian manufacturing ﬁrms for the period 1998-2003.
The data are drawn from the VIII and IX waves of the Survey on Manufac-
turing Firms collected by Capitalia (ex Mediocredito Centrale).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature
developed around the determinants of and the relationship between orga-
nizational governance and ﬁrm performance. Section 3 describes the data
and methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results and
Section 5 concludes.
32 Related literature
In this section we brieﬂy review two streams of related literature: (i) stud-
ies focusing on the empirical determinants of outsourcing and (ii) studies
aimed at empirically assessing the performance implications of governance
organisational arrangements, and, particularly, outsourcing.
2.1 The determinants of outsourcing decisions
With respect to what determines the decision to outsource, standard theory
and evidence generally suggests three factors as inﬂuencing for the decision
to re-locate production outside the ﬁrm’s boundaries (Abraham and Taylor,
1996; Girma and G¨ org, 2004; Diaz-Mora, 2005). The most important of
these is the possibility of saving labor costs, that is, of cutting wages and
beneﬁts payable to non-core employees by contracting out peripheral stages
of production to low-wage countries. This supposes that high-wage ﬁrms
would typically be expected to outsource production more intensively than
low-wage ﬁrms 1.
The next factor is demand volatility: the more a ﬁrm’s output is subject
to seasonal ﬂuctuations, the more it will try to outsource peak period tasks
in order to maintain as steady a ﬂow of employment as possible over time.
However, one would expect there to be a negative relationship between de-
mand volatility and the propensity to contract out if the ﬁrm were able to
internally re-organize tasks at relatively lower costs than the outsourcing
case. The third factor is the search for specialized skills or equipment that
the ﬁrm lacks in house. What is relevant here is the achievement of scale
economies in the supply of the process or service that the ﬁrms seeks to
outsource. There may be scale economies in the production of speciﬁc in-
puts such that ﬁrm size becomes a determinant of its outsourcing strategy:
since small and medium sized ﬁrms usually ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to achieve a
minimum eﬃcient scale of production, they will be more keen to outsource
1When ﬁrms, instead, outsource within the domestic economy, the rate of unionization
becomes relevant, even though its impact may be ambiguous: on the one side, unionized
ﬁrms have relatively less bargaining power with respect to workers and pay higher wages
than they might choose to pay. Therefore, a stronger union presence in an industry may
induce a ﬁrm in that industry to re-locate production in order to save on labor costs. On
the other side, however, if the objective of the union is to protect domestic employment,
a stronger unionization may be an obstacle to a ﬁrm’s desire to outsource.
4production. However, as small ﬁrms have less ﬂexibility than large ﬁrms to
react to variability in consumer demand, and they face higher search costs,
a positive relationship may emerge between ﬁrm size and outsourcing. In
addition to labor cost savings, output cyclicality and scale economies, there
are other factors that can contribute to the deciding to farm out some of
its production activities. Swenson (2000), for instance, focuses on changes
in international costs: strong dollar depreciation can lead to higher costs
of imports, thus reducing the international outsourcing intensity of ﬁrms.
In addition, G¨ org and Hanley (2004) point out that export propensity may
have a positive eﬀect on outsourcing: the more a ﬁrm exports, greater are
the possibilities to ﬁnd low wage foreign suppliers. Finally, technology can
play a role (Tomiura, 2004; Bartel, Lach, and Sicherman, 2005): in par-
ticular, there is a positive relation between outsourcing and intensive use
of computers in the workplace, high R&D intensity, and the presence of
a highly skilled workforce within domestic ﬁrms. And, ﬁrms closer to the
technological frontier are supposedly more willing to decentralize their ac-
tivities in order to take advantage of information and techniques that are
not directly widely available. For this reason, younger ﬁrms, having a lim-
ited history to learn about their own speciﬁc needs, are also more willing
to choose a decentralized organizational form than older ﬁrms (Acemoglu,
Aghion, Lelarge, VanReenen, and Zilibotti, 2006).
If the ﬁrm is seen as an ’administrative instrument’ that seeks for eﬃciency
gains (Leiblein, 2003), and the decision to outsource production as a choice
made within a particular, vertically disintegrated, governance structure,
TCE provides the standard framework for identifying other factors behind
ﬁrm’s vertical boundaries (Williamson, 1975; Joskow, 1988; Mazzanti, Mon-
tresor, and Pini, 2006). In this context, higher asset speciﬁcity, economies
of scale and market uncertainty are three important aspects that inﬂuence
the governance choice between production internalization - option to ’make’
- and production externalization - option to ’buy’ (Williamson, 1975, 1991;
Joskow, 1988; Masten, 1993; Lyons, 1995; Leiblein, 2003). In particular, the
more that assets are speciﬁc to a particular transaction, the more the ﬁrm
will tend to produce in-house in order to minimize the opportunistic be-
haviors of partners and suppliers. Asset speciﬁcity also aﬀects the capacity
of the market to aggregate demands, and, thus, achieve economies of scale.
It follows then that, in absence of speciﬁc assets, there is no constraint on
5demand aggregation, which provides external production with a consider-
able edge in terms of lowering production costs. Finally, given a high degree
of assets speciﬁcity, the more the environmental uncertainty, the lower will
be the propensity to outsource and the higher will be the probability that
ﬁrms will vertically integrate production (Williamson, 1975; Abraham and
Taylor, 1996).
2.2 The role of organizational governance
The decision to outsource or vertically integrate the ﬁrm’s production activ-
ities is one of the most complex choices facing management. Both strategies
entail costs and beneﬁts. However, while a great deal of attention has been
paid to the factors inﬂuencing the ’make or buy’ decision, relatively little
empirical work has been done to assess the performance implications of these
governance choices. In this context, TCE postulates that aligning transac-
tions with governance structures leads to more eﬃcient outcomes. However,
while there is empirical evidence to show that ﬁrms choose governance that
is consistent with TCE predictions, the performance implications of gover-
nance choices have been less well explored (Masten, 1993).
This literature has tented to stress the potential advantages associated with
outsourcing and vertical integration and, in particular, that the former leads
to a shift in the cost burdens from the home ﬁrm to its suppliers, and en-
ables the ﬁrm to specialize in its core activities. On the other hand, vertical
integration may enhance performance because of the coordination beneﬁts
associated with internalization and because the re-location of manufactur-
ing activities outside the ﬁrm’s boundaries may reduce its capabilities by
weakening cross-functional coordination, that is, the capability to transfer
information and coordination across activities within the same production
system (Mahoney, 1992; Teece, 1996; Leiblein, Reuer, and Dalsace, 2002).
According to Masten (1993), the main problem is that the classical tests of
the ’make-or-buy’ decision do not add to our knowledge about the impor-
tance of governance choices. In other words, the usual econometric tests of
the TCE propositions are indirect, they rarely investigate the cost of moving
from one type of contractual arrangement to another, that is, the cost of
not being aligned with a governance structure that optimizes production by
minimizing transaction costs. This problem may be overcome by controlling
6for the selection process used, even at the cost of more detailed data on
observed characteristics, costs and performance of alternative governance
choices. Some models have been proposed that aim to investigate not only
the degree to which organizational forms are aligned with transaction fea-
tures (Yvrande-Billon and Saussier, 2003), but also how this organization
misalignment aﬀects ﬁrm’s performance. These types of analyses generally
involve a two-stage approach in which, a probit/logit model identiﬁes the
main determinants of choice of governance, and constructs a variable to
represent the degree of governance misﬁt. In addition, a performance re-
gression is carried out to test whether, and how, the ’distance’ from the
optimal governance structure aﬀects ﬁrms’ techno-economic outcomes (Sil-
verman, Nickerson, and Freeman, 1997; Leiblein, Reuer, and Dalsace, 2002;
Yvrande-Billon and Saussier, 2003).
In terms of performance, results are mixed. Silverman, Nickerson, and Free-
man (1997) analyzing the US motor carriers industry between 1977 and
1989, found that the misalignment of employment relation had no signiﬁ-
cant impact on ﬁrm’s mortality, but also that ﬁrms that align their capital
structure based on TCE principles are less likely to fail. Nickerson and Sil-
verman (2004) show that, for the US hire truck industry, misaligned ﬁrms
suﬀer from lower proﬁtability, that is, lower annual returns on assets, and
higher mortality rates relative to better-aligned rivals.
Poppo and Zenger (1998) focused on qualitative performance based on data
on a set of top computer executives in the US. Their results support TCE
in showing that misaligned governance leads to lower quality service, lower
responsiveness to problems and inquiries, and lower customer satisfaction.
The implications of outsourcing versus vertical integration in terms of tech-
nological performance have received less attention. Leiblein, Reuer, and
Dalsace (2002) tested this relation in the production of semiconductor de-
vices in the US, using variables for governance misﬁt to capture the prob-
ability that too much governance is employed for transactions that are in-
ternally governed and the probability that too little governance is employed
for transactions that are outsourced. Cross-sectional estimates lead them to
conclude that technological performance, as measured by transistor density,
is particularly depressed by governance underﬁt, that is when ﬁrms fail to
implement adequate measures to oﬀset hazards in the contracting environ-
ment. Conversely, they could ﬁnd no evidence of a negative eﬀect from the
7excessive bureaucracy associated with governance overﬁt. In a study of R&D
alliances in the US telecommunication industry, Sampson (2004) shows that
good alignment increases the beneﬁts of collaboration by an average of 138%,
the actual magnitude of being dependent on the type of misalignment, that
is, the choice of pooling contracts for transactions that are characterized by
high hazard and opportunism or of equity joint ventures when transactions
are governed by excessive bureaucracy.
3 Data and methodology
3.1 The data-set
In this paper we use a balanced repeated cross-section of Italian manufac-
turing ﬁrms for the period 1998-2003. These data are drawn from the VIII
and IX waves of the Survey on Manufacturing Firms (Indagine sulle Imp-
rese Manifatturiere) carried out by Capitalia, which conducted interviews
in 2001 and 2004 respectively of all ﬁrms with 500 employees and over,
and with a representative sample of ﬁrms with more than 11 and less than
500 employees, stratiﬁed by geographic area, industry, and size. These two
waves of information gathering involved 4,680 and 4,289 ﬁrms respectively;
the number of ﬁrms in the merged sample, after deleting outliers and ob-
servations not presenting any balance sheet information, is of 1,777 ﬁrms.
Table 1 shows the structure of this sample of ﬁrms in terms of Pavitt sectors
for the merged sample and for the reference 1998-2000 wave2.
Table 2 refers to the 260 ﬁrms that outsourced some stages of their produc-
tion process during the period 2001-2003. They represent 14.6% of the 1.777
ﬁrms in our sample. It is interesting to note that ﬁrms outsourcing produc-
tion activities account for about the 75% of total outsourcing ﬁrms3. The
most intensive industries are ’Leather and footwear’ (23.5%), ’Computer
and electronics’ (21.1%) and ’Industrial machinery’ (19.5%). This latter
set of ﬁrms is of particular importance because the decision to outsource is
speciﬁcally directed to the production stages rather than to complementary
2In the analysis, we use Pavitt taxonomy rather than the standard classiﬁcation of
economic activities (ATECO) in order to avoid the possibility of perfect identiﬁcation of
the sample during the ﬁrst-stage logit estimation.
3The remaining 25% is constituted by ﬁrms that outsourced complementary services
such as accounting, cleaning, advertising, etc. See Appendix A for details on the speciﬁc
question posed to sample ﬁrms.
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Table 1: Sample structure by Pavitt sectors and employment class size
Pavitt Sectors (1998-2003) 11-20 21-249 250+ Total
Supplier Dominated 366 513 50 929
Scale Intensive 125 141 25 291
Specialized Suppliers 134 292 39 465
Science Based 30 55 7 92
Total 655 1.001 121 1.777
Pavitt Sectors (1998-2000)
Supplier Dominated 985 1.335 124 2.444
Scale Intensive 392 383 74 849
Specialized Suppliers 422 626 91 1.139
Science Based 70 150 28 248
Total 1.869 2.494 317 4.680
3.2 The econometric methodology
To assess the performance implications of alternative organizational struc-
ture choices - that is, production outsourcing versus integration - we use a
recently developed two-stage econometric methodology, which extends the
conventional TCE empirical research. Empirical works in this ﬁeld aims at
testing the validity of TCE hypotheses, and also investigating whether devi-
ation from TCE principles produces poorer techno-economic performance.
In the two stage methodology that we used to test the ’misalignment hypoth-
esis’ we conducted a probit/logit regression related to organizational choice;
then, based on the results of this regression we estimated a performance
equation by constructing a variable measuring the misalignment (Leiblein,
Reuer, and Dalsace, 2002; Yvrande-Billon and Saussier, 2003; Nickerson and
Silverman, 2004), using the governance misﬁt as a regressor.
In this paper we improve this analysis by including some other variables
that might aﬀect the ﬁrm’s decision to outsource production, such as labor
costs, technology, and export propensity, in addition to the traditional TCE
variables: that is, asset speciﬁcity and uncertainty. The variable for gov-
ernance misﬁt is calculated, in the ﬁrst stage, as the absolute value of the
9Table 2: Production outsourcing ﬁrms by industry (1998-2003)
Industry Firms Production Outsourcing Firms
N. N. %
Food, beverages and tobacco 155 5 3.2
Textile and clothing 211 30 14.2
Leather and footwear 81 19 23.5
Lumber and wood products 68 9 13.2
Paper, printing and publishing 94 13 13.8
Petroleum, reﬁning and related industries 5 0 0.0
Chemicals and allied products 79 9 11.4
Rubber and plastic Products 95 10 10.5
Stone, clay, and concrete products 111 5 4.5
Metal products 300 52 17.3
Industrial machinery 272 53 19.5
Computer and electronics 147 31 21.1
Transportation equipment 44 6 13.6
Other manufacturing industries 115 18 15.7
Total 1.777 260 100.0




where OG is Organizational Governance. In our case, the organizational
choice is discrete so that OGobserved takes the value 0 or 1 and OGpredicted
is the probability of choosing one of the two governance models, according
to both TCE and standard IFP analyses. The variables Misfit, thus, takes
values between 0 and 1: the closer its value is to 0, the more aligned is
the transaction, while the nearer its value is to 1 the more misaligned is
the transaction. Since we only know about ﬁrms that answered ’yes’ to the
question in the Survey (see Appendix A), our Misfit variable captures the
choice of outsourcing production when transactions’ conditions - high asset
speciﬁcity and uncertainty - would indicate that production should be kept
within the ﬁrm’s boundaries. Due to data limitation, we are not able to
directly measure the choice to integrate production under conditions when
it would be convenient to outsource - because of low asset speciﬁcity and
uncertainty. We are concerned with governance underﬁt (Leiblein, Reuer,
and Dalsace, 2002), since we are interested in studying under what condi-
tions the choice to externalize production is more proﬁtable for the ﬁrm.
The second stage of the analysis consists of estimating a performance equa-
10tion:
Yi,t = α1 + α2Misfiti,t + X0
i,tβ + νi,t (2)
where Yi,t denotes the variable for technological performance, Xi,t is a vector
of controls, and νi,t is an error term with the usual statistical properties.
The independent variables used in the ﬁrst-stage estimation can be grouped
into three typologies: (i) controls; (ii) variables measuring transaction at-
tributes such as uncertainty and asset speciﬁcity; and (iii) variables captur-
ing other factors underlying the decisions to outsource production, borrowed
from the literature on IFP.
As controls we consider ﬁve types of variables: (i) four geographic dum-
mies (North West, North East, Centre and South); (ii) three size dummies
(D11-20; D21-249 and D250+); iii) four Pavitt sector dummies (Scale In-
tensive; Specialised Suppliers; Science Based and Supplier Dominated); (iv)
a dummy (Group) measuring whether or not a ﬁrm belongs to a business
group; and (v) a variable (Lage) measuring the age of the ﬁrm. Appendix
B provides a more detailed deﬁnition of these variables.
As far as transaction attributes are concerned, we considered the following
proxies. We measure demand uncertainty as the variance in the annual per-
centage rate of change in total sales (Uncertainty), and asset speciﬁcity as
the ratio between the book value of total debt and the total assets (Asset
speciﬁcity). We also consider an interaction term between uncertainty and
asset speciﬁcity. At this point, it is useful to provide some insights into
our rationale for this measure of asset speciﬁcity. According to Williamson
(1988), debt and equity can be considered as diﬀerent forms of governance
structure. In fact:
”[D]ebt like market is less interventionist and the bond-holders can seize control over the
ﬁrms’ assets if and only if the ﬁrm has defaulted or violated the covenants of the debt
contract in some way. Equity is similar to hierarchical control. The rights of the equity-
holders are much more general than those of the bond-holders. They can exercise these
rights through the board of directors, by monitoring the conduct of management and inter-
vene in strategic decisions whenever it is deemed necessary” (Balakrishnan and Fox,
1993, pp. 6-7).
Within this TCE perspective, the type of governance chosen - equity and
debt - will depend fundamentally on the characteristics of the ﬁrms’ assets,
in particular, their redeployability with respect to more general purpose as-
sets. This property of some ﬁrms’ assets such as R&D, skills, brand name,
11reputational investments and so on tends to aﬀect the ﬁrm’s capital structure
trough bankruptcy costs. In the event of a ﬁrm’s bankruptcy and liquida-
tion, its more specialized and speciﬁc intangible assets face greater losses in
value, thus increasing the costs of ﬁnancing these assets with debt. Thus,
in this perspective, the debt asset ratio - our measure of asset speciﬁcity -
should be negatively related to intangibles, and ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets.
To capture the other factors behind the production outsourcing decision, we
consider the following variables: (i) labor costs per employee (Labor costs);
(ii) an export dummy (Exp) which takes value 1 if the ﬁrm exports and
0 otherwise; and (iii) a technology dummy (R&D) which gives information
about the ﬁrm’s propensity to invest in research and development4. All these
variables are calculated for the 1998-2000 wave so to a priori exclude any
possible problem of endogeneity in the relationship between the dependent
variable and the covariates. In the second stage of the analysis, the mis-
alignment variable (Misﬁt) - deﬁned as the absolute value of the diﬀerence
between observed organizational choices and those predicted by the theory
- is included into our technological performance equation.
Technological performance is measured using three diﬀerent dummies: Inn
for indicating if the ﬁrm has introduced any form of technological innovation
between 2001 and 2003 and Inn prod and Inn proc which indicate, respec-
tively, the introduction of a new product or a new process in the period
considered.
It is worth noting that since both the misalignment variable and technolog-
ical performance indicators refer to the same time period (2001-2003), we
cannot consider the second stage regressions as proof of an actual causal
relationship; however, their sign and magnitude allow us to identify which
type of correlation occurs between the variables considered. The sign and
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient of the Misﬁt variable is important: a negative
sign would indicate that ﬁrms that choose outsource (production) while hav-
ing good theoretical reasons for integrating it, suﬀer a reduction, or a cost,
in terms of their propensity to innovate.
4On this purpose, ﬁrm’s age (Lage) can also be considered a proxy of ’experience’ on
a technology (Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987; Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, VanReenen, and
Zilibotti, 2006).
124 Empirical results
The results of the econometric analysis are reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5.
Table 3 presents the results of the ﬁrst stage level (Logit) estimation: as
expected, the signs of the most relevant variables seem to conﬁrm the basic
predictions of TCE, and particularly in relation to the interaction between
asset speciﬁcity and uncertainty which is negative and statistically signiﬁ-
cant. This ﬁnding can be interpreted as indicating that in the presence of
high asset speciﬁcity, ﬁrms tend to outsource production when the environ-
ment is uncertain.
As far as the traditional determinants of production outsourcing - per-capita
labor costs, export, and R&D - are concerned, the variable for technology is
both positive, and statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests the role of technol-
ogy in inﬂuencing production outsourcing. In fact, a higher propensity to
invest in R&D leads the ﬁrm to externalize redundant, or low-value added
activities. In other words, it allows ﬁrms to focus on their ’technological
core’. At the same time, it is interesting that labor cost reasons, as well as
the seek for economies of scale, do not seem relevant in these processes.
Tables 4 and 5 show the results from the second-step in our analysis. In-
terestingly, the coeﬃcient on the dummy for total technological innovation
(Inn) is statistically signiﬁcant and positive. This means that, in general
terms, higher governance misalignment is associated with higher propensity
to innovate. We test for the potential presence of non-linear eﬀects in the re-
lationship between technological innovations and governance misalignment
by introducing a misﬁt squared term into the equation5.
The result of this analysis - which are presented in Table 4 - provide ev-
idences that the relationship between these two variables is quite compli-
cated, taking a non-linear bell-shaped form. This means that higher gov-
ernance misalignment is associated with higher propensity to innovate in
general terms only in the case of low values of misﬁt. After a certain value
threshold of this variable, an increase in the governance misalignment tends
to reduce the propensity to innovate: that is, as the value of misalignment
increases, ﬁrms face higher costs in terms of technological innovations.
To obtain a more detailed and informative picture of these phenomena we
5Equation (2) was estimated ﬁrst including the vector of characteristics Xi and then by
simply including the Misfit terms: the results were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. In Table
5 we report the results for Misfit and Misfit
2 only.
13conducted an analysis distinguishing between process (Inn proc) and prod-
uct innovations (Inn prod). As can be seen from Table 5, the coeﬃcient
for process innovation is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. In other
words, the impact of governance misalignment on technological performance
of ﬁrms in terms of process innovations seems to be in line with literature
predictions. The negative signs in Table 5 conﬁrm that ﬁrms less able to
conform to the optimum organizational strategy suﬀer a lower propensity to
adopt new production processes.
In the case of the product innovation variable, we ﬁnd a non-linear rela-
tionship between governance misﬁt and the introduction of new products or
improvements to existing ones (see also Figure 1).
There are two possible explanations for this somewhat puzzling framework.
On the one hand, ﬁrms seem to accompany their choices to outsource pro-
duction with the introduction of process innovations which changes the or-
ganization of their production transactions. In fact, ﬁrms less able to adapt
to the optimal organizational strategy are also those ﬁrms that show a lag
in the adoption and introduction of process innovations. On the other hand,
the initial positive and signiﬁcant correlation between product innovations
and governance misalignment can be interpreted as the result of the ﬁrms
embarking on a strategic process of repositioning through the introduction
of new products and improvements to existing ones. In other words, this
positive relationship may be a symptom of the ﬁrm’s adaptation behaviour:
higher misalignment is associated with higher ’propensity to change’. The
search for new markets or for new customers generates a process of adjust-
ment within the ﬁrm’s organization boundaries which could be the reason
for this ﬁnding. However, after a certain value, poor organizational align-
ment tends to have a negative impact on product innovation also.
A third explanation might rest on the path dependent nature of technology.
It is possible that, when governance misﬁt is low, the positive correlation
with product innovation could come from the positive sign of our R&D vari-
able. Since product innovation is supposed to be the outcome of earlier R&D
eﬀort, we can think of such a technology eﬀect as prevailing over a negative
impact from (low) misalignment. However, when the degree of alignment
with the optimal governance organization exceeds a certain threshold, the






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15Table 4: Second stage: technological performance and governance misalign-
ment
ESTIMATION METHOD LOGITa LOGIT
Dependent variable Inn Inn
Coeﬀ. t values Coeﬀ. t values
Misﬁt 1.103**b 4.91 14.79** 10.43
Misﬁt2 ... ... -14.32** -9.84
N. Obs. 1.777 1.777
MacFadden R2 0.012 0.055
ML R2 0.017 0.072
Efron R2 0.017 0.071
AIC 1.346 1.289
aThe regression also includes a constant term. All coeﬃcients are robust to het-
eroskedasticity.
b*Signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%




Dependent variable Inn proc Inn prod Inn prod
Coeﬀ. tvalues Coeﬀ. t values Coeﬀ. t values
Misﬁt -0.571*
b -1.88 1.287** 6.43 18.585** 12.25
Misﬁt
2 ... ... ... ... -17.97** -11.62
N. Obs. 1.777 1.777 1.777
MacFadden R
2 0.003 0.019 0.084
ML R
2 0.002 0.025 0.108
Efron R
2 0.002 0.025 0.114
AIC 0.867 1.333 1.245
aThe regression also includes a constant term. All coeﬃcients are robust to het-
eroskedasticity.
b* signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%
175 Conclusions
The main idea underlying this paper is that, when ﬁrms engage in produc-
tion outsourcing activities they move towards a business strategy based on
development of their ’core competencies’ (Prahlad and Hamel, 1990), that
is, the set of skills and knowledge that enables them to maintain competi-
tive advantage in the global market. If outsourcing saves on costs related to
the production of low value-added, or low-skill, production stages, then the
ﬁrm can specialize in high-value added activities, such as design, product
development, research, and rely on its ’technological core’ (Rumelt, 1982).
Within this framework, we expect a positive relationship between the choice
to outsource production and measures of technological performance.
Based on this, we empirically investigated the relationship between produc-
tion outsourcing decisions and ﬁrms’ technological performance.
Using ﬁrm-level balanced repeated cross-sections for the Italian manufactur-
ing industry for the period 1998-2003 and adopting a two-stage econometric
methodology, we obtained the following results. In the ﬁrst stage of our
analysis we found a positive coeﬃcient for R&D that is reﬂected in the pos-
itive sign for the technological performance obtained in the second stage.
Therefore, technology aﬀects the outsourcing decision of ﬁrms and, once the
outsourcing decision has been taken, the ﬁrm continues to engage in innova-
tion activities. Second, we suggest that the relationship between production
outsourcing and performance is not direct, but should be ﬁltered through
the analysis of the ﬁrm’s organizational governance choice. Third, gover-
nance misalignment negatively aﬀects the ﬁrm’s technological performance
in terms of product innovations for high values of governance misﬁt. In fact,
ﬁrms that are poorly aligned with the optimum organizational governance,
as predicted by the theory, suﬀer a poorer performance with respect to their
more aligned competitors. In other words, ﬁrms that outsource while hav-
ing good reasons to internalize their production (because of the high level
of hazard and uncertainty of the contracting environment), are associated
with lower technological performance than ﬁrms that outsource more appro-
priately.
However, in the case of product innovations, this occurs only after a cer-
tain threshold of misalignment. This apparently counterintuitive result can
perhaps be explained as follows: if outsourcing is seen as a kind of organi-
zational change, then we would expect that, the poorer the alignment with
18Figure 1: Non-linearity between product innovations and governance misalignment
19the optimal organizational governance, the higher would be the negative
correlation with the ﬁrm’s capacity to re-tool its production processes. The
data seem to conﬁrm a signiﬁcant correlation between these two indicators
of organizational change, that is, outsourcing and process innovation.
If we look at product innovation, the scenario is slightly diﬀerent, due to the
fact that this variable does not provide directly information on the ﬁrm’s
organization of production. Our empirical analysis shows that, in order for
there to be a negative eﬀect on product innovation, we need ’relatively high’
values of governance misﬁt: this ’threshold eﬀect’ tells us that low values
of misalignment are not in themselves suﬃcient to depress the technological
activity of the ﬁrm. This suggests that the positive eﬀect on product inno-
vation is related to the previous technological activity developed by the ﬁrm
(as given by R&D) which, in the ﬁrst stage, was shown to positively aﬀect
the ﬁrm’s decision to outsource production.
In summary, in the presence of low levels of governance misﬁt, the ’path
dependent’ nature of technological activity can be thought of not only as a
driver of the (ﬁrst-stage) outsourcing decision, but also as a driver of the
(second-stage) positive correlation between misalignment and product inno-
vation. In this case, up to a certain threshold, the governance misalignment
is not strong enough to negatively aﬀect the capacity of the ﬁrm to introduce
new products. When this threshold is passed, the eﬀect of misﬁt seems to
exceed the eﬀect of R&D, producing a negative correlation with respect to
technological performance.
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2 If yes, indicate which activity:




2.5 Research and development, engineering, projecting
2.6 Testing and technical analyses
2.7 Advertising
2.8 Research of personnel
2.9 Storage and packing
2.10 Surveillance and cleaning
2.11 Call center
2.12 Other activities (specify)
Source: Capitalia (2004), IX Indagine sulle Imprese Manifatturiere (2001-03), Rome.
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